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Abstract
Developing security-critical systems is diﬃcult and there are many well-known examples of security
weaknesses exploited in practice. In particular, so far little research has been performed on the
soundly based design of secure architectures, which would be urgently needed to develop secure
systems reliably and eﬃciently. In this abstract, we sketch some research on a sound methodol-
ogy supporting secure architecture design. We give an overview over an extension of UML, called
UMLsec, that allows expressing security-relevant information within the diagrams in an architec-
tural design speciﬁcation. We deﬁne foundations for secure architectural design patterns. We
present tool-support which has been developed for the UMLsec secure architecture approach.
Keywords: Secure software engineering, secure architectures, security engineering, security
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1 Motivation
The high quality development of security-critical systems is diﬃcult. Many
critical systems are developed, deployed, and used that do not satisfy their
security requirements, sometimes allowing spectacular attacks. In particular,
so far little research has been performed on the soundly based design of se-
cure architectures, which would be urgently needed to develop secure systems
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reliably and eﬃciently. Part of the diﬃculty of secure systems development
is that correctness is often in conﬂict with cost. Where thorough methods of
system design pose high cost through personnel training and use, they are all
too often avoided.
Within the ﬁeld of Software Architectures [2], the Uniﬁed Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) has been proposed to be used also as an Architecture Description
Language (ADL). In particular, UML oﬀers an unprecedented opportunity for
high-quality secure systems development that is feasible in an industrial con-
text.
• As the de-facto standard in industrial modeling, a large number of develop-
ers is trained in UML.
• Compared to previous notations with a user community of comparable size,
UML is relatively precisely deﬁned.
• A number of analysis, testing, simulation, transformation and other tools
are developed to assist the every-day work using UML.
This article, which is based on the tutorial [6] on the same topic, gives
a short introduction into using the formally based UML security extension
UMLsec to develop foundations for designing secure architectures. Firstly, we
recall the deﬁnition of a simpliﬁed fragment of UMLsec and its formal foun-
dation to be used in this paper. We sketch how one can use stereotypes, tags,
and constraints to encapsulate knowledge on secure architectures and thereby
make it available to developers which may not be specialized in secure sys-
tems. In particular, we explain how to use the formally based UMLsec to
provide foundations for secure architectural design patterns. We also demon-
strate how one can formally verify whether the constraints associated with
the stereotypes are fulﬁlled in a given secure architecture design using the
tool-support provided. This way one can ﬁnd ﬂaws present in the design be-
fore a system is deployed, or even implemented. Finally, we explain how to
provide foundations for designing secure systems based on the Java Security
Architecture.
2 Formal Basis for Secure Architecture Analysis
We shortly recall the formal basis of UMLsec from [5] which will be used for
secure architecture analysis in the later sections. More details can be found
in [5].
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Outline of Formal Semantics
For some of the constraints used to deﬁne the UMLsec extension we need to
refer to a precisely deﬁned semantics of behavioral aspects. For security anal-
ysis, the security-relevant information from the security-oriented stereotypes
is then incorporated.
Our formal semantics of a simpliﬁed fragment of UML includes activity
diagrams, statecharts, sequence diagrams, static structure diagrams, deploy-
ment diagrams, and subsystems, simpliﬁed to keep a formal treatment that
is necessary for some of the more subtle security requirements feasible. The
subsystems integrate the information between the diﬀerent kinds of diagrams
and between diﬀerent parts of the system speciﬁcation. We only outline the
basic concepts, a complete account is in [5], which also includes pointers to
earlier work on which this work is based.
In UML the objects or components communicate through messages re-
ceived in their input queues and released to their output queues. Thus for
each component C of a given system, our semantics deﬁnes a function C()
which
• takes a multi-set I of input messages and a component state S and
• outputs a set C(I, S) of pairs (O, T ) where O is a multi-set of output
messages and T the new component state (it is a set of pairs because of the
non-determinism that may arise)
together with an initial state S0 of the component.
The behavioral semantics D() of a statechart diagram D models the run-
to-completion semantics of UML statecharts. As a special case, this gives us
the semantics for activity diagrams. Given a sequence diagram S, we deﬁne
the behavior S.C() of each contained component C.
Subsystems group together diagrams describing diﬀerent parts of a system:
a system component C given by a subsystem S may contain subcomponents
C1, . . . ,
Cn. The behavioral interpretation S() of S is deﬁned as follows:
(1) It takes a multi-set of input events.
(2) The events are distributed from the input multi-set and the link queues
connecting the subcomponents and given as arguments to the functions
deﬁning the behavior of the intended recipients in S.
(3) The output messages from these functions are distributed to the link
queues of the links connecting the sender of a message to the receiver, or
given as the output from S() when the receiver is not part of S.
When performing security analysis, after the last step, the adversary model
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may modify the contents of the link queues in a certain way explained below.
Security Analysis
For a security analysis of a given UMLsec subsystem speciﬁcation S, we
need to model potential adversary behavior. We model speciﬁc types of ad-
versaries that can attack diﬀerent parts of the system in a speciﬁed way. For
this we assume a function ThreatsA(s) which takes an adversary type A and a
stereotype s and returns a subset of {delete, read, insert}. Then we model the
actual behavior of an adversary of type A as a type A adversary function that
non-deterministically maps the contents of the link queues in S and a state S
to the new contents of the link queues in S and a new state T :
• the contents of links stereotyped s where delete ∈ ThreatsA(s) may be
mapped to ∅ and
• the contents of links stereotyped s where insert ∈ ThreatsA(s) may be en-
larged by elements from the contents of links stereotyped t where read ∈
ThreatsA(t).
The adversary types deﬁne which actions an adversary may apply to a com-
munication link with a given stereotype. delete means that the adversary may
delete the messages in the corresponding link queue, read allows him to read
the messages in the link queue, and insert allows him to insert messages in the
link queue.
To evaluate the security of the system with respect to the given type of
adversary, we deﬁne the execution of the subsystem S in presence of an ad-
versary of type A to be the function SA() deﬁned from S() by applying
the adversary function to the link queues as a fourth step in the deﬁnition of
S() as follows:
(4) The type A adversary function is applied to the link queues as detailed
above.
The UMLsec proﬁle makes use of a formalization of the security require-
ment secrecy following one of the standard approaches in formal methods: It
relies on the idea that a speciﬁcation preserves the secrecy of some data d if
the system never sends out any information from which d could be derived,
even in interaction with an adversary (where the knowledge set collects the
information gained by an adversary).
We say that a subsystem S preserves the secrecy of an expression E from
adversaries of type A if E never appears in the knowledge set of A during
execution of SA().
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3 The UMLsec Extension: Architectural Stereotypes
We shortly recall a simpliﬁed fragment of the UMLsec proﬁle that is relevant
to secure architectures. A complete account can be found in [5].
For adaption to a particular application domain UML provides three “light-
weight” extension mechanisms: Stereotypes give a speciﬁc meaning to the
model elements they are attached to and are represented by double angle
brackets. A tagged value is a name-value pair in curly brackets associating
data with elements in the model. Furthermore, constraints may be attached
that have to be satisﬁed by the diagram.
We explain some of the UMLsec stereotypes and tags and give examples.
The constraints are parameterized over the adversary type with respect to
which the security requirements should hold; we thus ﬁx an adversary type
A to be used in the following. Some of the constraints refer to the formal
deﬁnitions in Sect. 2. They can be checked automatically using the tool-
support presented in [5].
Internet, encrypted, LAN
These stereotypes on links in deployment diagrams denote the respective
kinds of communication links. We require that each link carries at most one of
these stereotypes. For each adversary type A, we have a function ThreatsA(s)
from each stereotype s ∈ {〈〈 encrypted 〉〉, 〈〈 LAN 〉〉, 〈〈 Internet 〉〉} to a set of strings
ThreatsA(s) ⊆ {delete, read, insert}. This way we can evaluate UML speciﬁ-
cations using the approach explained in Sect. 2. We make use of this for the
constraints of the remaining stereotypes of the proﬁle.
As an example for a threat function, Fig. 1 gives the one for the default type
of attacker, which represents an outsider adversary with modest capability.
secure links
This stereotype, which may label subsystems, is used to ensure that se-
curity requirements on the communication are met by the physical layer.
More precisely, the constraint enforces that for each dependency d stereo-
typed 〈〈 secrecy 〉〉 between subsystems or objects on diﬀerent nodes n,m, we
have a communication link l between n and m with stereotype s such that
read /∈ ThreatsA(s).
Example In Fig. 2, given the default adversary type, the constraint for the
stereotype 〈〈 secure links 〉〉 is violated: The model does not provide communica-
tion secrecy against the default adversary, because the Internet communication
link between web-server and client does not provide the needed security level
according to the Threatsdefault(Internet) scenario.
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Stereotype Threatsdefault()
Internet {delete, read, insert}
encrypted {delete}
LAN ∅
wire ∅
smart card ∅
POS device ∅
issuer node ∅
Fig. 1. Threats from the default attacker
secrecy
〈〈 call 〉〉 or 〈〈 send 〉〉 dependencies in object or component diagrams stereo-
typed 〈〈 secrecy 〉〉 are supposed to provide secrecy for the data that is sent along
them as arguments or return values of operations or signals. This stereotype
is used in the constraint for the stereotype 〈〈 secure links 〉〉.
secure dependency
This stereotype, used to label subsystems containing object diagrams or
static structure diagrams, ensures that the 〈〈 call 〉〉 and 〈〈 send 〉〉 dependencies
between objects or subsystems respect the security requirements on the data
that may be communicated along them. More exactly, the constraint enforced
by this stereotype is that if there is a 〈〈 call 〉〉 or 〈〈 send 〉〉 dependency from an
object (or subsystem) C to an object (or subsystem) D then the following
conditions are fulﬁlled.
• For any message name n oﬀered by D, n appears in the tag {secret} in C if
«Internet»
«secrecy» server machineclient machine
get_password
browser
client apps
access control
web server«call»
«secure links»
remote access
Fig. 2. Example secure links usage
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Random generator
seed: Real
random(): Real
random(): Real
Random number
«interface»
Key generation «secure dependency»
newkey(): Key
«call»
«critical»Key generator
newkey(): Key
{secret={newkey(),random()}}
Fig. 3. Key generation subsystem
and only if it does so in D.
• If a message name oﬀered by D appears in the tag {secret} in C then the
dependency is stereotyped 〈〈 secrecy 〉〉.
Example Figure 3 shows a key generation subsystem stereotyped with the
requirement 〈〈 secure dependency 〉〉. The given speciﬁcation violates the con-
straint for this stereotype, since Random generator and the 〈〈 call 〉〉 dependency
do not provide the security levels for random() required by Key generator.
critical
This stereotype labels objects whose instances are critical in some way, as
speciﬁed by the associated tag {secret}, the values of which are data values
or attributes of the current object the secrecy of which are supposed to be
protected. This protection is enforced by the constraints of the stereotypes
〈〈 data security 〉〉 and 〈〈 no down− ﬂow 〉〉 (depending on the degree of secrecy
required) which label subsystems that contain 〈〈 critical 〉〉 objects.
data security
This stereotype labeling subsystems has the following constraint. The sub-
system behavior respects the data security requirements given by the stereo-
type 〈〈 critical 〉〉 and the associated tags, with respect to the threat scenario
arising from the deployment diagram. More precisely, the constraint is that
the stereotyped subsystem preserves the secrecy of the data designated by the
tag {secret} against adversaries of type A as deﬁned in Sect. 2.
Example The example in Fig. 4 shows the speciﬁcation of a simple secu-
rity protocol. The sender requests the public key K together with the certiﬁ-
cate
SignKCA(rcv :: K) certifying authenticity of the key from the receiver and
sends the data d back encrypted under K (here {M}K is the encryption of
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rs
entry/i:=0 entry/j:=0
«send»
«call»
«call»
«send»
Receivercomp«Internet»
Sendernode Receivernode
receive():Data
transmit(e:Data)
request():Exp
send(d:Data)
WaitReq
send(d)
/request()
return(C)
receive() transmit(E)
SecureChannel
R:ReceiverS:Sender
Sendercomp
«LAN»
S:Sender R:Receiver
s:
r:
R:Receiver
sending
send(d:Data)
«Interface»
receiving
receive():Data
«Interface»
«LAN»
request()
Received
WaitTrmentry/j:=j+1
Send
Requestentry/i:=i+1
Wait
«data security»
«critical»
«critical»
{secrecy={d}}
S:Sender
{adversary=default}
send(d:Data)
receive():Data
/transmit({d :: i}k)
k ::=head(ExtKR(DecK−1
S
(C)))
[k∈Keys∧
tail(ExtKR(DecK−1
S
(C)))= i]
/return({SignK−1
R
(kj :: j)}KS)
[tail(Deckj(E))= j]
/return(head(Deckj(E)))
i :N; K−1S ,KR :Keys
j :N; k ,K−1R ,KS :Keys
{fresh={k }}
Fig. 4. Security protocol
the message M with the key K, DecK(C) is the decryption of the ciphertext C
using K, SignK(M) is the signature of the message M with K, and ExtK(S) is
the extraction of the data from the signature using K). Assuming the default
adversary type and by referring to the adversary model outlined in Sect. 2,
one can establish that the secrecy of d is preserved.
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4 Foundations for Secure Architectural Design Patterns
There are several conceptual aids for designing secure architectures using
UMLsec. For example, in [5], we explain how to use tool supported tech-
niques such as reﬁnement and modularity. In this section, we shortly sketch
how one could use security patterns in the context of UMLsec.
Software Architecture Patterns [1] encapsulate the design knowledge of
software architects by presenting recurring design problems and standardized
solutions. One can use transformations of UMLsec models to introduce pat-
terns within the design process. A goal of this approach is to ensure that the
patterns are introduced in a way that has previously been shown to be useful
and correct. Also, having a sound way of introducing patterns using trans-
formations can ease security analysis, since the analysis can be performed on
the more abstract and simpler level, and one can derive security properties of
the more concrete level, provided that the transformation has been shown to
preserve the relevant security properties.
In our approach, the application of a pattern p corresponds to a function fp
which takes a UML speciﬁcation S and returns a UML speciﬁcation, namely
the one obtained when applying p to S. Technically, such a function can be
presented by deﬁning how it should act on certain subsystem instances, and
by extending it to all possible UML speciﬁcations in a compositional way.
Suppose that we have a set S of subsystem instances such that none of the
subsystem instances in S is contained in any other subsystem instance in S.
Suppose that for every subsystem instance S ∈ S we are given a subsystem
instance fp(S). Then for any UML speciﬁcation U , we can deﬁne fp(U) by
substituting each occurrence of a subsystem instance S ∈ S in U by fp(S).The
challenge then is to deﬁne such a function fp that is applicable as widely as
possible. How to do this on a technical level is beyond the scope of this ﬁrst
introduction to UMLsec. Here we just demonstrate the idea by an example.
Consider the problem of communication over untrusted networks, as ex-
empliﬁed in Fig. 5. A well-known solution to this problem is to encrypt the
traﬃc over the untrusted link using a key exchange protocol, as demonstrated
in Fig. 4. A detailed explanation of this pattern is given in [5]. The Secure
Channel Pattern could thus be formulated intuitively as follows: In a situa-
tion such as the one in Fig. 5, one can implement the secure channel needed
to enforce the security requirements using the system in Fig. 4.
To apply this pattern p in a formal way, we consider the set S of subsystems
derived from the subsystem in Fig. 5 by renaming: This means, we substitute
any message, data, state, subsystem instance, node, or component name n by
a name m at each occurrence, in a way such that name clashes are avoided.
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«Interface»
send(d:Data)
Receivercomp
R:Receiver
Sendernode Receivernode
receive():Data
Channel
Sendercomp
send(d)
/transmit(d)
s:
receive()
/return(d’)
transmit(d’)r:
R:Receiver
send(d:Data)
«Interface»
«data security»
S:Sender
receiving
receive():Data
transmit(d’:Data)
receive():Data
«send»S:Sender
sending
send(d:Data)
{adversary=default}
Wait
Wait Send
Received
{secrecy={d}}
«critical»
s r
S:Sender R:Receiver
«LAN»«LAN»
«send»
«encrypted»
Fig. 5. Secure architecture pattern example: sender and receiver
Then fp maps any subsystem instance S ∈ S to the subsystem instance derived
from that given in Fig. 4 by the same renaming. This gives us a presentation of
fp from which the deﬁnition of fp on any UML speciﬁcation can be derived as
indicated above. Since one can show that the subsystem in Fig. 4 is secure in
a precise sense, as explained in [5]. this gives one a convenient way of reusing
security engineering knowledge in a well-deﬁned way within the development
context.
5 Secure Foundations for the Java Security Architec-
ture
In this section, we explain how to provide foundations for designing secure
systems based on the Java Security Architecture.
Dynamic access control mechanisms which are part of security architec-
tures such as the JDK 1.2 Security Architecture with its GuardedObjects can
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be diﬃcult to administer since it is easy to forget an access check [3]. If the ap-
propriate access controls are not performed, the security of the entire system
may be compromised. Additionally, access control may be granted indirectly
and unintentionally by granting access to an object containing the signature
key that enables access to another object. We show how to use UMLsec in the
context of the Java Security Architecture to address these problems by provid-
ing means of reasoning about the correct deployment of security architectural
mechanisms such as guarded objects.
Authorization or access control is one of the cornerstones of computer
security. The objective is to determine whether the source of a request is
authorized to be granted the request. Distributed systems oﬀer additional
challenges. The trusted computing bases (TCBs) may be in various locations
and under diﬀerent controls. Communication is in the presence of possible
adversaries. Mobile code is employed that is possibly malicious. Further
complications arise from the need for delegation, meaning that entities may
act on behalf of other entities. Also, many security requirements are location-
dependent. For example, a user may have more rights at the oﬃce terminal
than when logging on from home.
In Java, this problem is addressed at the architectural level by providing
a Java Security Architecture. In particular, from JDK 1.2, a ﬁne-grained
security architecture is employed which oﬀers a user-deﬁnable access control,
and the sophisticated concept of guarded objects [3]. Permissions are granted
to protection domains. A protection domain [7] is a set of entities accessible
by a principal. In the JDK 1.2, protection domains consist of classes and
objects. They are speciﬁed depending on the origin of the code, as given by
a URL, and on the key with which the code may be signed. The system
security policy set by the user or a system administrator is represented by
a policy object instantiated from the class java.security.Policy. The security
policy maps protection domains to sets of access permissions given to the
code. There is a hierarchy of typed and parameterized access permissions,
of which the root class is java.security.Permission and other permissions are
subclassed either from the root class or one of its subclasses. Permissions
consist of a target and an action. For ﬁle access permissions in the class
FilePermission, the targets can be directories or ﬁles, and the actions include
read, write, execute, and delete. An access permission is granted if all callers
in the current thread history belong to domains that have been granted the
said permission. The history of a thread includes all classes on the current
stack and also transitively inherits all classes in its parent thread when the
current thread is created. If the supplier of a resource is not in the same
thread as the consumer, and the consumer thread cannot provide the access
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control context information, one can use a GuardedObject to protect access to
the resource. The supplier of the resource creates an object representing the
resource and a GuardedObject containing the resource object, and then hands
the GuardedObject to the consumer. A speciﬁed Guard object incorporates
checks that need to be met so that the resource object can be obtained. For
this, the Guard interface contains the method checkGuard, taking an Object
argument and performing the checks. To grant access the Guard objects simply
returns, to deny access it throws a SecurityException. GuardedObjects are a
quite powerful access control mechanism. However, their use can be diﬃcult
to administer. For example, guard objects may check the signature on a class
ﬁle. This way, access to an object may be granted indirectly, and possibly
unintentionally, by giving access to another object containing the signature
key for which the corresponding signature provides access to the ﬁrst object.
Thus the sophisticated access control mechanisms of the JDK 1.2 Security
Architecture are not so easy to use. The granting of permissions depends on
the execution context. Sometimes, access control decisions rely on multiple
threads. A thread may involve several protection domains. It is not always
easy to see if a given class will be granted a certain permission. In the remain-
der of this section, we explain some UMLsec stereotypes that support secure
use of the Java Security Architecture mechanisms.
guarded access
This stereotype of subsystems is supposed to mean that each object in
the subsystem that is stereotyped 〈〈 guarded 〉〉 can only be accessed through
the objects speciﬁed by the tag {guard} attached to the 〈〈 guarded 〉〉 object.
Formally, we assume that we have name /∈ KpA for the adversary type A
under consideration and each name name of an instance of a 〈〈 guarded 〉〉 object,
meaning that a reference is not publicly available. Also, we assume that for
each 〈〈 guarded 〉〉 object there is a statechart speciﬁcation of an object whose
name is given in the associated tag {guard}. This way, we model the passing
of references.
We illustrate this stereotype with the example of a web-based ﬁnancial
application. Two institutions oﬀer services over the Internet to local users:
an Internet bank, Bankeasy, and a ﬁnancial advisor, Finance. To make use
of these services, a local client needs to grant the applets from the respective
sites certain privileges. Access to the local ﬁnancial data is realized using
GuardedObjects. The speciﬁcation of the local system part is given in Fig. 6.
It contains the simpliﬁed relevant part of the Java Security Architecture which
receives requests for object references and forwards them to the guard objects
of the three guarded objects. Since the 〈〈 guarded 〉〉 objects StoFi, FinEx, and
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MicSi can only be accessed through their associated guard, the subsystem
instance fulﬁlls the condition associated with the stereotype 〈〈 guarded access 〉〉
with regard to default adversaries. The access controls are realized by the
Guard objects FinGd, ExpGd, and MicGd, whose behavior is speciﬁed. For
example, applets that are signed by the bank can read and write the ﬁnancial
data stored in the local database, but only between 1 pm and 2 pm. This which
is enforced by the FinGd guard object, where we assume that the condition
slot is fulﬁlled if and only if the time is between 1 pm and 2 pm.
guarded
This stereotype labels objects in the scope of the stereotype 〈〈 guarded access 〉〉
above that are supposed to be guarded. It has a tagged value {guard} which
deﬁnes the name of the corresponding guard object. As an example, in Fig. 6,
the 〈〈 guarded 〉〉 objects StoFi, FinEx, and MicSi are protected by the {guard}
objects Guard objects FinGd, ExpGd, and MicGd, respectively.
6 Tool Support
To facilitate the application of our approach in industry, automated tools
for the analysis of UML models using the suggested semantics are required.
We describe a framework that incorporates several such veriﬁers currently
developed at the TU Mu¨nchen. More information can be found in [5].
The Fig. 7 illustrates the architecture of the UML tool framework which
meets the listed requirements. We brieﬂy describe its functionality. The devel-
oper creates a model and stores it in the UML 1.5 / XMI 1.2 ﬁle format. The
ﬁle is imported by the Java-based tool into the MDR repository which is part
of the Netbeans library. The tool accesses the model through the JMI inter-
faces generated by the MDR library. The checker parses the model and checks
the constraints associated with the stereotype, by calling sophisticated anal-
ysis engines such as the ﬁrst-order logic automated theorem prover e-Setheo,
the model-checker Spin, and Prolog-based analysis routines. The results are
delivered as a text report for the developer describing found problems, and
a modiﬁed UML model, where the stereotypes whose constraints are violated
are highlighted.
7 Experience and Outlook
The method proposed here has been successfully applied in secure systems
projects, for example in an evaluation of the Common Electronic Purse Spec-
iﬁcations under development by Visa International and others, in a project
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/return[sig=bank   slot=true]
[sig=cert] /return
/return[sig=finan   limit=true]
StoFi
«call»
JavaSecArch:
ExcGd:
MicGd:FinGd:
getObj(obj,sig)
chkGd(sig)
chkGd(sig)
MicGd
limit: Bool
JavaSecArch
«call» «call»
«call»
«call»
«call»
«call»
chkGd()
FinGd
slot: Bool
ExcGd
chkGd()
chkGd()chkGd()
MicroKey: Keys
Sign(req:Exp):ExpRead():Exp
ExcData: Exp
[obj=StoFi] /FinGd.chkGd(sig)
/return(FinEx)
FinEx MicSi
FinData: Exp
Read():Exp
Local «guarded access»
StoFi.Read():Exp
StoFi.Write(arg:Exp)
FinEx.Read():Exp
MicSi.Sign(req:Exp):Exp
getObject(Exp,Exp):Exp
Write(arg:Exp)
CheckReq
WaitReq
WaitReq WaitReq
CheckReq
CheckReq
chkGd(sig)
{guard=ExcGd}
«guarded»
{guard=FinGd}
«guarded»
{guard=MicGd}
«guarded»
[obj=FinEx]
/ExcGd.chkGd(sig)
CheckReq
/MicGd.chkGd(sig)
[obj=MicSi]MGdReturn?
FGdReturn?
/return(MicSi)
return
WaitReq
return
Fig. 6. Financial application speciﬁcation: Local system
with a large German bank analyzing a security-critical Internet bank archi-
tecture, and in projects analyzing a Biometric access control architecture of
a German telecom company and an automotive emergeny application of a
German car manufacturer within the Verisoft project funded by the German
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UML Editor
(UML 1.5 / XMI 1.2 - compliant)
e.g. Poseidon 1.6
UML Model
(UML 1.5 /
XMI 1.2)
Analysis engine
MDR
JMI
Model
and
Desired
properties
Result
Text Report
Static Checker
Dynamic Checker
Analysis Suite
Modified
UML
Model
Error Analyzer
“uses"
data flow
Fig. 7. UML tools suite
Ministry of Science and Technology. In particular, these experiences indicate
that the approach is adequate for use in practice.
Given the current state of security-critical systems in practice, with many
weaknesses reported continually, it seems to be a promising idea to apply
model-driven development to secure systems architecture design, since it en-
ables developers with little background in security to make use of security
engineering knowledge encapsulated in a widely used design notation. Since
there are many highly subtle security requirements which can hardly be ver-
iﬁed with the “bare eye”, even critical systems experts may proﬁt from this
approach.
For these ideas to be of beneﬁt in practice, it is important to have intelligent
tool-support to assist in using them. As sketched above, tools exist that one
can use to check the constraints illustrated above mechanically, which supports
the approach by saving time and preventing errors when analyzing the model
for security design ﬂaws.
More information can be found in the book [5] and articles including [4].
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